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 After the death of Stalin in 1953 the So-
viet Union experienced the melt-down period, 
referred to as The Thaw. The Khrushchev era 
gave rise to multiple underground associations 
that were the building blocks of the future de-
mocracy. They were non-conformist groups like 
the Lianozovo School of Oscar Rabin and musi-
cians such as Visotsky and Akudjava that gradu-
ally destabilized the regime from within and con-
sequently became the catalysts for the break of 
the Soviet Union. This was the period in which 
underground, non-conformist art groups formed 
to share their independent views on society 
and culture; it was the common goal that united 
them and created a rich social capital through-
out. Breaking away from the government influ-
ence and commands, radical young individuals 
formed social groups that were built around a 
common scepticism toward the government and 
the goal to radically break away the order. Peo-
ple formed tight circles based around their family 
and friends, as they shared common views and 
ideas about life. However, after the fall of com-
munism in Bulgaria and in Russia, the form of 
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underground communities still remained in the 
collective consciousness, as people became 
even more secluded around their tight circles 
of family and friends. The family bonds became 
the new cradle of trust that might have resulted 
in the low levels of bridging and out-group trust. 
Trust toward government institutions and formal 
organisations have dramatically declined in ac-
cord with the decline in social and political par-
ticipation.
Through my observations of the Bulgar-
ian society from 2000 to present, I propose that 
the informal personal contacts, rather than for-
mal institutional participation, tend to generate 
social trust and hamper institutional legitimacy. 
The family substitutes the role of the institution 
as it provides for value priorities and moral re-
sources for one’s realisation. Contrary to the 
Tocqueville1 and Putnam model, I propose that 
in Bulgaria and Russia, such personal relations 
generate trust and intermediary organisations do 
not. Furthermore, the paper will study the levels 
of trust in comparison to the levels of participa-
tion; to the level of economic development, and 
the development of the family structure as an in-
fluential factor of trust and social/political partici-
pation. The study will focus on the development 
of post-communist Bulgaria and Russia (from 
1999 to the present) and it uses the Chinese and 
Dutch societal model for comparison.
2. Introduction
With the fall of communism in both post-
communist countries (Bulgaria and Russia) the 
formal public participation declined in accord 
with the decrease in social and political trust. 
However, the interwoven structure of the family 
functions as the epicentre for the continuation of 
social traditions. From the World Value Survey 
we learn that people in both countries trust most 
their families and close friends, and distrust any 
kind of social and political structures (esp. gov-
ernment). We also see that most participation 
takes place in activities involving tight social cir-
cles and less in any kind of formal (sport, church, 
work) organisations, and least in any kind of po-
litical or governmental institutions. For example, 
the World Value Survey shows us that - in Russia 
38.5% and in Bulgaria 24% of society does not 
trust the Parliament at all, in contrast to the Neth-
1 Civic and political organisations educate individuals about 
being citizens in a free society. Such groups may also form 
alliances with like-minded organisations in order to lobby 
or coordinate their advocacy messages. Most importantly, 
these organisations become reservoirs of social capital and 
trust. 
erlands with 4.8%. Furthermore, from the survey 
sections — “Frequency of spent time”, we notice 
that Bulgaria and Russia prevail in spending time 
with family and friends and minimal with formal 
organisations (like church, sports and communal 
organisation). It is shocking to note that 79.6% of 
the Bulgarian and 67.8% of the Russian popula-
tion claims “not involved” in any voluntary organ-
isations. Whereas in the US and the Netherlands 
the cultural participation has dramatically risen, 
Bulgaria and Russia report almost 90% of their 
population as “no member of any organisation”.2
According to the results from the Euro-
barometer survey for 2004, the Bulgarian insti-
tutions were facing a crisis of confidence. Low 
levels of trust have remained the same (since 
the fall of the regime) for most of the national 
political institutions, while some “don’t knows” 
have been transformed into negative opinions. 
Plamen Georgiev claims that, “the result is 10 
points decrease in trust in the National Parlia-
ment (81%), 6 point decrease in political parties 
(83%), a 7 point decrease in national government 
(70%) and 5 point higher mistrust in the Bulgar-
ian justice system (70%).” (Plamen, 2007: 138). 
Out of all countries surveyed by the Euro barom-
eter, Bulgarians tend to mistrust the most their 
national legal system. The survey also shows 
that, out of all countries polled, Bulgarians and 
Romanians are the most dissatisfied with their 
quality of life. While pessimistic about the politi-
cal institutions and their quality of life, Bulgarians 
have shown high expectations towards the Euro-
pean Union. Particular support and optimism has 
been reflected by young people between 15 and 
24 years of age. In general, the Euro-barometer 
reports show that Bulgarians have become less 
pessimistic in national terms and more realistic 
in their Euro-optimism and the role of Europe in 
the future of their country. However, what is the 
reason for the decline of trust and participation 
after the fall of the regime? How can we com-
pare the Bulgarian case with the Chinese socio-
political model? How do we fight antagonism 
and growing pessimism in the Balkans?
2 The survey results have been extracted from the World 
Value Survey – Bulgaria (1999) and Russia (1999)
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3. History and Old Age
The political and social behavior of the 
Balkans can be explained by the inherited culture 
of traditional antagonism that relates not only to 
their communist past. Nikolay Valkov describes 
this behavior as formed around culture, history 
and the political model of the country. (Valkov, 
2009) Furthermore, his study closely compares 
the resemblance between Latin European coun-
tries to post-communist countries in their demo-
cratic political model and low voluntary organi-
sational membership. It could be argued that 
the interpersonal relations on the micro-level 
influence the social and political structure of the 
state. Nevertheless, through his analysis, Valkov 
opposes this theory and concludes that the low 
associational life model in post-communist soci-
eties is not necessary correlated with their demo-
cratic performance. Instead, he believes that the 
low membership rates should be understood as 
something which has its own internal logic and 
explanation. “The origins lie in the nature of the 
societal transformation in the region.” (Valkov, 
2009: 14). Bulgarians in this way are less bound 
to the values of individual worthiness. Their so-
cial solidarity is a hybrid of the old structured col-
lectivism that emerged as structures during the 
transition, believes Plamen Georgiev.
Eastern and Central Europe have good 
reason to distrust the government, since they 
have lived in authoritarian regimes, some more 
totalitarian than others, forced to subjugate indi-
vidual interest to those of the Communist Party. 
Social participation in “volunteer” and political 
organisations was advocated (if not enforced), 
which led to drastic decline in any kind of po-
litical or civic organisations after the fall of com-
munism. With the fall of the regime, the reaction 
was a massive alienation and distrust toward 
the communist regime and “lingering cynicism 
toward political and civil institutions” (Georgiev, 
2007:138). One may speculate that with the 
fall of the regime, there would have been an 









Courts of Law 18%
Parliament 15%
* Survey conducted by Gallup, July 
2005
Table 1
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increase in social participation and enthusiasm 
for independent civic and cultural organisations. 
As Nikolay Valkov states in his study of post-
communist countries, there is an expectation 
that vigorous civic engagement precedes, trig-
gers, or follows democratization of an authoritar-
ian political regime. (Valkov, 2009: 2). However, 
with the development of democracy in Bulgaria 
and Russia (1990-1999) the World Value Survey 
shows a decline in civic and political activism. 
The reappearance of democracy in Eastern and 
Central Europe coincided with the decline in as-
sociational activity. In relation to decline in social 
participation, we also witness a decline in politi-
cal and civic trust. Contrary to the Tocquevillian 
model, which infers that democratic systems 
increase participation, it seems that post-com-
munist societies such as Russia and Bulgaria do 
not necessary manifest the inferred high volun-
tary activism. 
To the question: “Can most people be 
trusted?”- Bulgaria (1997-1999) witnessed 8% 
decline, while Russia (1990-1999) witnessed 
a 15.7% decline. Confidence in Parliament de-
clined: in Bulgaria (1990-1999) with 24% and in 
Russia (1990-1999) with 22%. The New Democ-
racies Barometer (2001) exhibits Bulgaria and 
Romania as the countries with the highest level 
of distrust among the new democracies. The re-
sults here reflect the difference in experience of 
each country under communism. Furthermore, 
William Mishler and Robert Rose speculate that 
most citizens don’t distinguish between institu-
tions of state and society but they judge them 
holistically and evaluate them sceptically. (Mish-
ler, Rose, 1997: 420). This argument resembles 
the one put forward by Thompson in Cultural 
Theory (Ellis,Thompson, Wildavski, 1990), and 
is ambitious enough to involve future studies on 
how fatalism affects participation. Why did trust 
decline and continues to decline in Bulgaria? On 
the other hand, how can we compare the Chi-
nese social model to Bulgaria and Russia?
Trust is to be consequentially developed 
by the society and it needs to come from the 
positive performance of political and civil institu-
tions that, as Hirschman says, is measured by 
“reasonable measure of individual and collective 
good” (Hirschman, 1970: 58). Trust is initially 
very important for the development of democ-
racy in post-communist countries like Bulgaria 
and Russia. “Trust in civil institution doesn’t di-
minish democracy but completes it, enhancing 
the effectiveness of political institutions” (Mish-
ler, Rose, 1997: 420). In the case of Bulgaria 
and Russia, one can speculate that the fall of the 
regime witnessed an increase in social activism, 
which adopted “the fight for democracy” as their 
slogan. However, the legitimacy of institutions 
was no longer judged by ideology but by perfor-
mance. Thus, the economic downfall resulted in 
decreased political trust and participation, and 
increased social dissatisfaction. The Standard 
Eurobarometer Analysis of 2008 states the fol-
lowing:
“Bulgarians continue to be least satis-
fied with their way of life of the entire Eu-
robarometer poll (59%). However, while, 
in the spring (2008), they felt strongly 
the positive effects of EU membership 
and their life satisfaction was on the rise, 
reaching its highest scores (40%), now 
– under the influence of the crisis, it has 
decreased (by 2 points). This strong dis-
satisfaction with life may be explained 
by the unanimous opinion of citizens 
that compared to the average in the Eu-
ropean countries, the situation in Bul-
garia is worse in all areas: 88% give a 
negative assessment regarding the situ-
ation of the national economy, 77% - re-
garding the employment situation, 84% 
- regarding energy prices, and at least 
nine out of ten interviewed – regarding 
the cost of living (92%) and the quality 
of life (93%).” (Standard Eurobarometer 
70, 2008)
The growing income gap between the 
people and the insufficient pensions also fur-
thered the antagonism in Bulgaria. When asked: 
“How would you rate the current retirement funds 
in Bulgaria?”, 82% of the Bulgarians answer as 
“Bad + Very Bad”, while only 52% of the Euro-
pean Union population reports the same. Bul-
garia and Hungary are presented as the Euro-
pean States with the highest dissatisfaction rate 
in their retirement funds. At the same time, 25% 
of Bulgarian households report in WVS to have 
the minimum salary income, in comparison to 
the only 9% of Russian, and 2% of Chinese and 
Dutch households. While we see highly skewed 
data for Russia and Bulgaria, Chinese and Dutch 
data have a rather uniform bell-shaped distribu-
tion. Do income and retirement funds affect par-
ticipation? The data show that Bulgarians with 
lowest income levels tend not to participate in 
voluntary organisations. However, income is not 
the only cause for decline in participation; age 
proves to be another important factor that we 
have to control for.
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In order to dig deeper into the causal-
ity of the decline in trust and participation of the 
Bulgarian, Russian and Chinese society, we 
must look at the age distribution in these coun-
tries (Table 2). It is striking to see that 23.3% of 
the Bulgarian society consists of people over 65 
years old, while in the Chinese they comprise 
only 6% of the population. There is a big dif-
ference in Bulgarian and Chinese demograph-
ics, where the Bulgarian population growth rate 
is -0.813% (2008 est.), the Chinese is 0.629% 
(2008 Est.). How does this affect the reports on 
trust and participation of the two populations?
The older generation in Bulgaria reports 
to participate least in voluntary organisations and 
expresses the highest dissatisfaction with life. 
For example, to the question in the World Value 
Survey: “Please look carefully at the following 
list of voluntary organisations and activities and 
say...which, if any, you belong to?” 79% of the 
Bulgarians answered “Belong to none”. Here 
we see that only 20% of Bulgarians and 32% of 
Russians belong to any voluntary organisations, 
in contrast to 92% of Dutch. In order to explain 
this phenomenon of decline in associational life 
we must look at two factors: age and income of 
the population. As previously noted, 43% of the 
interviewed Bulgarians is above 50 years of age; 
while in China it is only 25%. In other words, the 
dominant population of Bulgaria consists of el-
derly (born after 1951) while China consists of 
predominantly 33-49 year olds. Therefore, the 
analysis has to control for the variable of age and 
income to see whether their effect on participa-
tion. When controlling for age, the World Value 
Survey presents that 46% (BG) of the “Belong 
to None” section is made up of people above 50 
years old  (Table 3). Interestingly enough, the 
Chinese model shows that 43% of the “Belong to 
None” section is composed of 15-29 year olds. 
Therefore, the Bulgarian and Chinese model 
seems to differ in the level of participation be-
tween their age groups. What does this tell us 
about the younger generation in China and the 
older generation in Bulgaria? Since the Bulgar-
ian population is dominated by the older genera-
tion, we see that this survey on participation is 
also influenced by the opinions of the elderly.
The outcomes also support observa-
tions made by Terry Clark in his The New Po-
litical Culture that younger people participate 
more than the elderly (Clark, Hoffmann-Martinot, 
1998:126). In support of the New Political Model, 
we see that in Bulgaria there is a decline in asso-
ciational life with the increase of the age factor. 
Similarly, the table below shows a decrease in 
cultural activism with the increase of age.
5. Social and Cultural Participation
James Coleman and Robert Putnam 
both emphasize trust as an important factor for 
the establishment of civil society, the sense of 
community and connection between citizens in 
institutions that connect them with government. 
Political activism is an example where the so-
cial trust is measured in participation. In Bowl-
ing Alone, Robert Putnam chooses bowling as 
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an example of civic participation, which provides 
for bonding and establishment of social trust. He 
further argues that social trust is strongly associ-
ated with forms of civic engagement and social 
capital. Putnam implies that “people, who trust 
their fellow citizens, volunteer more often, par-
ticipate more often in politics and community 
organisations.” (Putnam, 2000: 136-137). It is 
discouraging to see the statistic on Bulgaria and 
Russia, which show a decline in participation 
and relevantly the decline in trust. In her article 
Socialization for Participation, Natalia Letki dis-
cusses that the low level of citizen involvement 
in politics, in East-Central Europe, is linked to 
low levels of social capital. Letki mentions the 
prevailing apathy, lack of interest and low par-
ticipation in politics. (Letki, 2004: 669). Accord-
ingly, the author cites leading sociologists such 
as Inglehart and Catterberg, who argue that the 
weakness of political involvement are blamed on 
the weakness of civil society and low levels of 
interpersonal trust. 
The World Value Survey and the New 
Democracies Barometer present very little posi-
tive trust in civil and political institutions (for Bul-
garia) with most distrust directed toward the Ju-
diciary System and the Parliament. Participation 
in political parties, trade unions and other gov-
ernment organisations is witnessing a decline. 
From Putnam’s point of view, Bulgaria and Rus-
sia are witnessing a great decline in participation 
in relation to trust. However, one might argue 
that this evaluation is based only on the analysis 
of formal civic and political organisations.
As argued by Clark, Achterberg and 
Navarro, Putnam doesn’t take an account for 
scenes3 and thus excludes the unofficial types of 
social participation, which also generate social 
3 Scenes are the concept introduced in Clark, Achterberg, 
and Navarro conference paper Culture is on the Rise - Why? 
Theories of Cultural Participation and Empirical Evidence. 
Scenes are constructed by physical structures, people and 
neighborhoods. People’s interaction with these structures 
creates the dynamic of scenes. The three aspects of scenes 
(values on which they are judged) are: legitimacy, authentic-
ity and theatricality. 
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 Rising Membership of Cultural Activity Groups
Country 1981 1990 2000 Delta
Netherlands 12,5 34,6 45,2 32,7
USA 13,9 19,7 36,9 23
Bulgaria 4,3 4 -0,3
Portugal 6,2 3,7 -2,5
Brazil 5,4 2,4 -3
Latvia 6,8 3,7 -3,1
Russia 4,9 1,2 -3,7
Lithuania 7,3 2,9 -4,4
China 7,3 2,2 -5,1
* Survey conducted by Terry Clark, University of Chicago
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capital. For example, Clark studies the “rising 
membership of cultural activity groups” in order 
to emphasize the role of scenes in the post-ma-
terialist countries. (Clark, Achterberg, Navarro 
2007: 11). The Netherlands witness the high-
est rise of membership, while Bulgaria, Russia 
and China present a negative delta growth. Why 
does membership decline in Bulgaria and Rus-
sia, and how can we compare their outcomes to 
the Chinese model?
 The studies and analysis of Clark, 
Achterberg and Navarro show that cultural par-
ticipation in post-communist or communist coun-
tries is decreasing (Table 3). They explain this 
phenomenon as - participation in the post-com-
munist countries doesn’t lead to legitimacy. On 
the other hand, we should consider the idea that 
social structures have lost their legitimacy on the 
grounds of historical ineffectiveness and force-
ful authoritarian model. Furthermore, how does 
China compare to this model? We see in the 
table above that Chinese participation in cultural 
organisations is even lower than Bulgaria and 
Russia. In regards to the state economy, Bulgar-
ia reports the lowest economic growth between 
the three countries, which could be correlated 
with the negative participation levels. On the 
other hand, China reports a GDP of $3.251 tril-
lion (2007 est.) and at the same time witnesses 
the lowest social association. What does this say 
about the Chinese model? The Chinese society 
reports to be most concerned with materialistic, 
not post-materialistic values. Since the change 
of the regime from legitimacy based on ideol-
ogy to legitimacy based on performance, the 
Chinese society has witnessed increase in trust 
toward the economic performance of the coun-
try, rather than the cultural/voluntary institutions. 
Students place a great deal of faith in the capac-
ity of economic growth to solve their problems. 
While students agree that the environment is a 
serious problem, they place economic develop-
ment before environmental protection in terms of 
domestic goals. (Stalley, Yang, 2006: 13). Anoth-
er example becomes the environmental NGOs, 
which maintain only about 100 volunteers, of 
which only 20 are considered regular contribu-
tors. Many Chinese environmental organisations 
posses a degree of freedom, say Phillip Stalley 
and Dongning Yang. Nevertheless, these philan-
thropic and environmental organisations remain 
closely tied to the state and perform functions 
in line with the central government policies. The 
government’s restrictions on NGOs and social 
organisations are argued by Peter Ho to have 
this negative effect on participation (Ho, 2001).
In general, the Chinese society remains 
restricted because of limitations in its political op-
portunity structure – the lack of elections, the re-
strictions on social organisations and the lack of 
civil society. In addition, the Chinese society has 
been focusing on the two most important domes-
tic development goals – 1) promoting scientific 
advancement and 2) controlling the population. 
So, environmental protection has been viewed 
as post-materialist issue and has been ranked 
below the government’s materialist goals. The 
belief in the “ideology of economic development” 
has hampered the likelihood of anti-pollution 
movement and the support in post-materialist 
issues. Therefore, the Chinese society can be 
defined as materialistic and not yet issue-based, 
which partially explains its negative cultural 
participation levels. Here, the Chinese model 
is similar to outcomes of Bulgaria and Russia; 
however the mechanism, which explains it turns 
out to be very different. While the Bulgarian so-
ciety shows a decrease in cultural participation 
because of distrust and antagonistic behavioral 
patterns, China’s negative delta membership 
comes from the government’s emphasis on the 
economic, rather than cultural, development. 
 Another explanation to why there is a 
decline in voluntary and cultural organisations 
on the Balkans and Russia, given by Plamen 
Georgiev in The Bulgarian Political Culture, is 
that their society is less aware of the instruments 
of genuine democratic government; their mental-
ity is still set on the centralist model, like China 
(Georgiev, 2007:111). As previously noted by 
Gallup International (2005), the President earns 
71% of the Bulgarian’s trust and the Army 55%, 
while the Parliament earns only 15%. Cross 
compared internationally, the survey by the All-
Russian Public Opinion Research Center (2009) 
found that trust levels for President Medvedev 
(Russia) have grown to 73 percent in the past 
three years. It is striking to see that both Bulgar-
ian and Russian presidents have earned more 
than 70 percent of their citizens’ trust, when at 
the same time 22 percent of them express that 
the previous political regime was “Bad” (1999). 
However, the Gallup International presents a du-
alistic concept. Does the survey actually test the 
“Trust in the President” or the “Trust in the Presi-
dency”?
 Plamen Goergiev infers that the survey 
defined rather dualistically by the concepts of 
“President” and “The Presidency” seems to be 
not less consistent (Georgiev, 2007: 112). He 
presents data for the levels of trust in different 
presidents: (1992) saw an 88% of the “blue” 
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cohort strongly supporting the President, while 
1993 reported less than 50% support. The turn-
ing point was the reign of Z. Zhelev’s appeal 
for a national agreement and the restructuring 
of the political space. The results proved a drop 
in shared trust toward his personality and at the 
end of 1995 Bulgarian voters reported less than 
50% support. It is interesting to note that Geor-
giev also argues that the attitudes toward the 
Presidency are not influenced by the hypothetic 
models of “imperial”, “corporative” or “symboli-
cally week”. Instead of evaluating on the “ideal 
type model”, the Bulgarians prove to be influ-
enced more by the personality of the individual. 
Personal legitimacy has clearly become more 
important than the institutional legitimacy model 
of the Soviet past. Here charisma dominates 
“the regime”. “President of ‘all Bulgarians’ has 
been the most acceptable mantra of latest vot-
ing campaigns, whereby a ‘non-militant’ (even 
though paternalist) role of the President is given 
merit.” (Georgiev, 2007: 112). The Alpha Re-
search4 done in October 2000 further discusses 
the trust toward the President:
“In general, the Bulgarians are more 
likely to trust institutions as the Presi-
dent and the mayor, which are directly 
elected and are embodied by a certain 
personality. This to large extent is due to 
the strict reticence towards the people 
around - 77% of the respondents stand 
to the position that “one has to be very 
cautious with the people” (Alpha Re-
search, 2000: 4).
 Unfortunately, the World Value Survey 
doesn’t study the confidence level for the role 
of the president in the Bulgarian society. Never-
theless, WVS shows “Confidence in the Armed 
Forces” as being 60%. The Bulgarian army en-
joys higher trust than any other institution since 
1989. This is because the army has been tradi-
tionally and rather sentimentally bound institution 
in the nation’s political culture. Georgiev further 
defines the army as a contributor toward the terri-
torial integrity and has played a role of significant 
socializing institution (Georgiev, 2007:112). Just 
as Tocqueville defines the intermediary organi-
sations as socialization structures, the Bulgarian 
army is seen as a “melting pot” for ethnic, edu-
cational and cultural differences in the country. 
4 Alpha Research is a private, independent full-service re-
search agency, established in 1997. It is a member of ESO-
MAR (The European Society for Opinion and Market Re-
search) and of the Bulgarian Sociological Association.
Therefore, the army counts as a reliable factor of 
stability in Southeastern Europe. Since societal 
expectations remained unmet after the fall of the 
regime, the social distress and antagonism grew 
constantly. Negativism toward the previous po-
litical system is mostly observed in the younger 
generation (15-29 year olds). The elderly, how-
ever, show more trust and more optimism toward 
the old political regime and towards the armed 
forces. Instead, the people over 50 years of age 
report the most dissatisfaction with life; they tend 
to have the lowest income levels and to be mis-
treated by the state as they receive miserable 
pensions.
 A 45% of the people over 50 years of 
age (the sociodemographics given by the WVS) 
witness total butchering of their expectations by 
the mistreatment of the state. Thus, the growth 
of antagonism and nostalgia within the circles of 
the older population seem inevitable. The need 
for a strong leader is expressed by the Bulgar-
ian society in the WVS, which reports 48% being 
in favor of having a strong leader. Contrastingly, 
only 13% of the interviewed Chinese reported as 
being in favor of such model. Even after the fall 
of communism and the fight for democracy, the 
Bulgarian mentality remains most trustful in the 
paternalistic-authoritarian model. 
 Not very different from the Chinese 
case, the Eurobarometer for 2008 reports Bul-
garia as definitely in favor of more economic de-
velopment and interested in materialist values, 
rather than post-materialist issues. For example, 
“What expenditure, do you think, has the largest 
share of the European Union budget?” (2008), 
38% of Bulgarians report as “don’t knows”. 35% 
think that they go for economic growth and only 
1% think that they go for culture and media. 
However, when asked “For what sector would 
you like most of the EU budget to be used?” Bul-
garians place first the economic growth (like the 
Chinese) and least the culture/media (Table 6). 
 This opinion study of the European Ba-
rometer (2008) shows that the society is in need 
of economic betterment; it focuses mostly on the 
materialist values, rather than post-materialist is-
sues.
6. The Family
 The analysis up to here aimed to explain 
the reasons and effects of decline in trust in the 
Bulgarian and Russian society. We looked at 
how income and economic levels affect partici-
pation, how materialist state goals hamper the 
rise of post-materialist values and movements. 
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On the other hand, we observed the increase 
in social antagonism as a result of growing in-
equality and dissatisfaction with life in society. 
This section will try to further focus on the levels 
of trust that society reports and how does inside 
and outside group trust affect participation and 
the development of society. Who do Bulgarians 
trust? Why? And where do they spend most of 
their leisure time? 
 “Our Circle” became a common phrase 
used during the Thaw period in Russia and in 
Bulgaria, where tight circle of family and friends 
would meet and discuss shared ideology and 
opinions. The family structure, which was pre-
dominantly nuclear, helped in the establish-
ment of tight bonds and facilitated the creation 
of strong social capital among its members. In 
a way, the circle generated the micro-level trust 
which has declined towards the state in the last 
years of the regime. Through tough political and 
economic transitions, the Bulgarian society wit-
nessed a decline of the social ties that existed 
during communism. The social inequality and 
the later emergence of “dirty money” and corrup-
tion triggered the disintegration of society, which 
led to social alienation and loss of institutional le-
gitimacy. The older generation in particular tends 
to express suspicion and negativism toward the 
newly rich. Inequality and miserable financial 
status of most elderly in Bulgaria has proven to 
affect their social and political trust levels. From 
my personal observations of the older genera-
tion in Bulgaria, it seems that the elderly have 
isolated themselves within a very limited circle of 
family and friends who have earned their trust. 
It can be argued that the family substitutes the 
role of the institutions as it provides for value pri-
orities and moral resources for one’s realization. 
Contrary to the Tocqueville and Putnam model, 
I propose that in Bulgaria and Russia, such per-
sonal relations generate trust and intermediary 
organisations do not. 
 Relevant to the WVS study of “Par-
ticipation in Voluntary organisations”, (Table 4), 
the survey based on “Spending of leisure time” 
analyses where and how people spend their 
time. According to Terry Clark, unofficial social 
interactions, such as consumption, generate a 
strong social capital (Clark, Achterberg, Navarro 
2007: 11). In this sense, based on the survey on 
“spending leisure time” we could analyse where 
and how people interact and hypothesize how 
social capital is constructed in the different coun-
tries.
 From this table presented by the WVS, 
we can see that in contrast to the United States, 
more than 70% of the interviewed from China, 
Russia and Bulgaria report to “not at all” spend 
their time in sports, cultural or communal organi-
sations. When we add the variable of “age” to 
the table, we see that in Bulgaria (1999) 55% 
of the people over 50 years of age don’t spend 
any time, while 45% of the younger spend their 
time weekly in such organisations,. On the other 
hand, in Russia (1999) - 60% of the 30-49 year 
olds don’t spend any time, but 65% of the young-
er interviewees spend their time weekly in com-
munal organisations. Why is there such a gen-
erational gap? What makes the older population 
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Table 4
Spending of leisure time: “How often do you spend time with people at 
sports, culture, communal organisations?”
Country Not at all Only a few times
Once a 
month Weekly
Bulgaria 70% 7% 11% 10%
China 85% 9% 2% 2%
Russian Federation 75% 10% 5% 6%
United States 25% 26% 24% 20%
* World Value Survey (1999)
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more isolated, less trustful and not participating? 
When we test the WVS section of “Spend leisure 
time”, the data shows that Russians and Bulgar-
ians hardly spend any time in formal clubs, or-
ganisations or cultural gatherings. An influential 
factor for these negative results are the opinions 
reported by the older generation. Nevertheless, 
we should a question: why is this so? The mar-
ginals table shows very intriguing results under 
the section “Not applicable”. It is interesting to 
note that only Bulgaria and Russia show per-
centage outcome in this section. The result for 
Bulgaria (46%) and the Russia (23%) shows a 
very high percentage that shouldn’t be ignored in 
this analysis. What does “Not applicable” mean? 
Does it mean that such organisations are a non-
existing concept for 46% of the Bulgarians and 
23% of the Russians? During the communistic 
regime, the Bulgarian and Russian society were 
required to become members of organisations – 
such as sports clubs, youth clubs, party organi-
sations, and various professional unions – which 
were controlled by the state. However, with the 
fall of the regime, these organisations vanished 
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Taking note of the marginals section under this study, the following is observed:
Table 5
Marginals for question: “How often do you spend time with people at sport, 
culture, communal organisations?”
Country Not applicable % n
Bulgaria 46 460
China 0,0 0
Russian Federation 23,3 583
United States 0,0 0
World Value Survey (1999)
*The marginals section pays attention to the section “Not Applicable” and the 
results that follow under the countries of Bulgarian (1999) and Russia (1999).  
or were modified and altered into new forms 
adaptable to the new democratic society. It is 
reasonable to infer that with the disintegration of 
these formal clubs and organisations, the older 
generation couldn’t adapt with the new forms or 
was not well-informed about the emergence of 
new ones. In general, the older generation expe-
rienced inequality from the state (in terms of in-
come and pension) and was left in isolation from 
the rapidly emerging new forms of civil life. This 
neglect and seclusion left the elderly with the in-
ability to adapt to the tempo of the social mod-
ernizations. In these terms, older people in both 
countries might show inadequate responses to 
surveys like the one shown above. “Not appli-
cable”, thus proves to be a very important field 
for further examinations and speculations.
Nevertheless, the WVS from 1999 ob-
serves a decline of social participation in formal 
organisations in Bulgaria, Russia and China. A 
more recent study under the European Barom-
eter examines the changes in the Bulgarian so-
ciety after 2007 and it reports pessimistic out-
comes not very different from the observations 
in 1999. “Citizens’ mistrust towards national gov-
ernments, parliaments and the judiciary has reg-
istered again, as in previous surveys, its highest 
levels, and trust – the lowest scores, in the whole 
Eurobarometer survey” (Eurobarometer, 2008: 
5). On the other hand, the above mentioned 
economic inequality and the general influence 
of the economic downfall coincides with growing 
outgroup distrust in the Bulgarian and Russian 
society. WVS (1999) asks: “Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted 
or that you need to be very careful in dealing with 
people?” The answers are:
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(1) Most people can be trusted 
(2) Can’t be too careful
A 67.5% of Bulgarians and 73.7% Rus-
sians show increasing distrust toward the rest 
of the society. In contrast to China (43.8%) and 
the Netherlands (40%), the two post-communist 
countries report that most people cannot be 
trusted. In his article on the E Pluribus Unum: 
Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first 
Century, Robert Putnam proposed two theo-
ries that reflect the effect of growing diversity 
- Theory 1: Diversity enhances bridging and 
out-group solidarity and Theory 2: Diversity en-
hances bonding and in-group solidarity (Putnam, 
2007: 115). Contrary to these theories, Bulgaria 
reports to be one of the Balkan countries with 
the highest diversity, and at the same time with 
steady ethnic tolerance. Thus, the increase in 
social distrust cannot be fully explained on the 
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Table 6
“Most people can be trusted?”




Russian Federation 22,9 73,7
* World Value Survey (1999)
terms of diversity. The growing distrust in the two 
countries might be a result of economic shifts, 
diversity growth or cultural value shifts in the dif-
ferent generations. These three factors should 
be a theme for further research on the decline 
of trust in these two communities. However, we 
will focus on another important factor that might 
have an influence on these social and cultural 
developments – the structure of the family. The 
structure of the Bulgarian and Russian family 
plays an important role throughout history and 
has contributed toward the formation of very par-
ticular communal social structures and folklore 
culture. The family has always been an epicen-
ter of folklore and religious rituals and so it has 
generated strong interpersonal trust within its 
members. We can further note that during the 
Soviet years, society turned pessimistic toward 
the role of institutions and their ineffectiveness; it 
further obtained trust toward the role of interper-
sonal contacts as essential instruments to ex-
change and attain goods. Accordingly, the Alpha 
Research (October 2000) surveying the political 
participation in the Bulgarian society: 
“Family and political institutions are po-
sitioned in the two poles of the public 
trust. Strongest is the confidence in kin-
ship. According to a decimal grade scale 
(where 1 means absence of trust, and 
10 marks full trust), only family and rela-
tives receive grades close to the maxi-
mum - family takes 9.6, and relatives 
are assessed with 7.9. Next in place are 
neighbors (5.9) and Bulgarian  nation-
als, i.e., those with whom people com-
municate directly.” (Alpha Research, 
Oct. 2000)
Likewise, the WVS studies how these 
countries spend their leisure time. The questions 
that deal with a participation or spending time in 
formal or communal organisations show nega-
tive results, while the ones that deal with fam-
ily and friends show strong positive outcomes. 
It is interesting to note that the Chinese spend 
most time with family, which is also observed in 
Bulgaria and Russia. We note further that Bul-
garia and Russia show strong distrust toward 
their own societies, which indicates the outgroup 
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distrust of these societies. Nevertheless, we ob-
serve more ingroup trust, more bonding rather 
than bridging and more time spent with family 
and close friends rather than at any civic asso-
ciations. 
 In The New Political Culture, a following 
model is proposed (Clark, Hoffmann-Martinot, 
1998: 27): 
 Having a slimmer family and more edu-
cation contributes towards the increase in indi-
vidual and group tolerance. These factors also 
facilitate the rise of the New Political Culture. 
However, having a slimmer family and the pos-
session of individualistic values is not embedded 
in the Bulgarian and Russian history. Instead the 
cultural forms of the two countries have devel-
oped around the nuclear and extended family 
structures, which Maria Todorova has studied as 
far as during the Ottoman rule of Bulgaria. The 
“cult of the family” can be explained through the 
evolution of the family model in the Balkan his-
tory. In her Balkan Family Structure and the Eu-
ropean Pattern: Demographic Developments in 
Ottoman Bulgaria, Maria Todorova emphasizes 
the Balkan tendency to predominate in nuclear 
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 Slimmer Family: decline in extended 
family; weakening of family links 
More Education: more media access 
 
More tolerance of individual and 
group tolerance 
family households since 1863 (Todorova, 2006: 
25). Changes within the family structure have oc-
curred due to variety of factors – social structure 
and social values, economy and environmental 
constraints. Nuclear family dominated during the 
Ottoman rule and the extended family expanded 
during the Soviet period. Following the Soviet 
era, observations show an increase of extended 
households during the 1990s. Second, it appears 
likely that some reversal occurred over the first 
quarter of the 20th century due to the substantial 
increase in the share of solitaries. For the long 
Soviet period, however, the relative order of the 
categories remains roughly the same. The larg-
est group is simple family households, account-
ing for 41% and 55%. The second and third 
largest categories are solitaries and extended/
multiple households with 18–22 and 15–24%. 
Finally, there is a more or less stable 10–15% 
one-parent households. During pre-soviet and 
Soviet period, it was the norm for newly mar-
ried couples to co-reside with the parents of one 
of the two spouses. “For the years up to 1970 
they yield an expected bandwidth variation of ex-
tended households of between 30 and 45%, i.e. 
well above the actual percentage of extension 
found in the population census data for these 
years.” (Afontsev et al., 2008: 177). According 
to the logic of the model, Afontsev argues that 
this would mean that not even all ‘available’ wid-
ows joined their married children’s household at 
old age, and she strongly suggest that nuclear 
family formation was the norm. Starting from the 
1970s, however, the calculations yield an ex-
pected share of extended households of around 
20%, which approaches the ‘real’ values enough 
to hint at the possible existence of an extended 
family system during the later Soviet period.
Similar to the Bulgarian model, the Rus-
sian family structure also portrays a traditional 
pattern of nuclear and extended family struc-
tures. In looking at the history of the family struc-
ture, we must also take under consideration the 
structure and availability of housing as a factor 
that influences patterns of household formation. 
As Sergey Afontsev et al. mention in their study 
urban housing in Russia was in very short sup-
ply throughout most of the 20th century, with the 
exception of the years of actual de-urbanization 
during the Civil War. (Afontsev et al., 2008: 190). 
In the table above, it is seen that the share of 
solitaries among urban households was lowest 
during the 1930s to 1950s, when housing was 
most scarce due to the combination of high rates 
of rural–urban migration and low investment in 
civil construction. The shortage of housing thus 
obviously became an important factor behind the 
formation of extended and multiple households, 
and influenced the cultural preferences that fa-
vored such households. Newly married couples 
often could not obtain separate apartments un-
til their 30s and so, like the Bulgarian families, 
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had not much of a choice but to reside with their 
parents. Important is to consider the ecology-
dependent mechanism, which the communal 
apartments (komunalki) introduced towards the 
pattern of family life. From the Communal Liv-
ing in Russia Project we are able to grasp the 
atmosphere of the interior structure of the ko-
munalki, and to also read primary documents 
written by members of these social/family struc-
tures. There are many reasons why people lived 
in communal apartments in the Soviet period, 
and why many continued to live in them after the 
collapse. From a simple historical view, the se-
vere shortages of housing explain the existence 
in these komunalki (in Bulgaria and Russia) dur-
ing the entire USSR. The ideology behind this 
mass phenomenon came from the state’s com-
munist philosophy of “communal lifestyle”. After 
the collapse, many unmarried, divorced or wid-
owed women remained living in them, because 
of the inability to improve their standard of liv-
ing and the decline in their pensions/incomes. 
“Unless they have cash income apart from their 
primary salaries, personnel in education, health 
care, the sciences, civil administration, and other 
public sectors earn less than the average month-
ly salary (as of 2006, 9900 rubles per month or 
approximately $343, according to the Russian 
Federal State Statistics Service)” (Buckley, Gur-
enko, 1997: 1).
In Bulgaria (1990), the Country Stud-
ies Series by the Federal Research Division 
of the Library of Congress reports: 65% of the 
population averaged only half a room per fam-
ily member. Only 36% of families with children 
under eighteen had a separate children’s room; 
65% used the living room as a bedroom; and 
57 % used the kitchen as a bedroom. By 1990 
communal apartments were becoming rarer, 
however; at that time, 12 percent of families 
shared a kitchen with another family (Nations 
Encyclopedia, 1992). The Country Studies also 
report that 60 % of the younger generation was 
forced to stay in their parents’ homes after mar-
riage. In 1990 over 40 % of homes included two 
or more families or other relatives of one family. 
Members of three or even four generations of-
ten lived together. Traditional acceptance of the 
extended family contributed to this situation, but 
long waits for separate housing also played a 
critical role. In 1979 the government established 
a special Young Newlywed Families Fund that 
ensured that new families would receive at least 
25 % of new government housing. This program 
delivered more housing to young families in the 
1980s, but waiting lists also grew longer during 
that period. 
The relationship between housing and 
patterns of household formation proves to be 
much emphasized in the 1990s because of con-
struction standstill in both countries. The 2002 
census outcomes also reflect the emergence 
of a phenomenon relatively new to the Russian 
and Bulgaria society — young urban profession-
als leaving the parental home before marriage 
and setting up one-person households in rent-
ed or purchased apartments (Afontsev, 2008: 
178). The modernization tendencies enforce of 
the emergence of a contingent of young urban 
professionals who set up a separate household 
before marriage. Nevertheless, social and eco-
nomic instability in these two countries contin-
ues to strengthen the institute of family as an 
income-pooling unit, including the traditional ex-
tended family household. Because of the eco-
nomic instability and the transitional processes 
that are still underway, it cannot yet be predicted, 
which of these trends will eventually prevail.
In these terms, the family remains a 
strong institution which has traditionally formed 
the moral values and cultural patterns in both 
Bulgaria and Russia. As Inglehart has noted, 
some post materialistic values have had an 
impact on the younger Bulgarian generation – 
autonomy, postponing marriage and increased 
mobility (Inglehart, 1997: 132). However, he 
also claims that empirical evidence is still limited 
and not representative to predict the develop-
ment of the activist role of the family in relation 
to affirmation of the democratic values (Geor-
giev, 2007: 121). In addition, the Bulgarian and 
Russian family structure cannot yet be defined 
as “slim”, as mentioned by Clark’s model in The 
New Political Culture (Clark, Hoffmann-Martinot, 
1998). Even though not slim, the contemporary 
Bulgarian family is to be characterized with high 
educational homogeneity, says Plamen Geor-
giev. (Georgiev, 2007: 120). As previously noted, 
Terry Clark’s model suggests that higher educa-
tion and slimmer family lead to the increase in 
individual and group tolerance (Clark, Hoffmann-
Martinot, 1998). However, the two influential fac-
tors are not fully expressed in the Bulgarian case. 
The educational level seems relatively high but 
the family has not evolved to answer the catego-
ry of “slim”. As a result, though, Georgiev further 
notes that the Bulgarian society reports a steady 
ethnic tolerance, especially concerning religion. 
The Ottoman occupation and the WWII Jewish 
immigrant population in Bulgaria have resulted 
in gradual increase in ethnic tolerance. There-
fore, the Bulgarian social mechanism doesn’t 
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seem to fit the NPC model proposed by Clark. 
In the Bulgarian and Russian case stud-
ies, the family has become the basic factor for 
political socialization and milestone for shaping 
the new civic culture. The economic instability in 
the two countries has enforced the strength of 
the family unit, while it has also increased the 
distrust toward local institutions and authorities. 
The social capital cannot be sought as a product 
of intermediary organisations, as De Tocqueville 
argues, but has allocated itself in the isolated 
family unit structures and the informal social folk-
lore practices. Wedding processions, socializing 
over coffee, sitting parties and unofficial folklore 
dance collectives are types of these unofficial 
socio-cultural scenes in Bulgaria that encour-
age social participation in contrast to the institu-
tionalized organisations. To relate it internation-
ally, this unofficial cultural model of Bulgaria and 
Russia is similar to Spain’s informal social scene 
of Pandillas and Movidas. Furthermore, these 
social practices reveal a continuation of folklore 
culture that is built around the family structure 
and inspired by an oral tradition. Folklore prac-
tices in general have been formed in a more in-
timate scale and have become situated around 
the circle of family and relatives. 
Even though personal relations seem to 
generate trust and intermediary organisations 
do not, we should consider the social trust that 
is directed toward the national institutions. If the 
personal relations and family circle provide trust 
and other organisations do not, then how do we 
explain the trust in EU institutions that Euro-
barmeter (2008) reports?
“Trust in the European Union among 
Bulgarians is higher than the trust in 
other international organisations, such 
as NATO and UN. The high level of trust 
in the EU and its institutions is in sharp 
contrast with the new wave of mistrust 
in the Bulgarian institutions.” (Standard 
Eurobarometer 70, 2008)
            Unlike the average EU citizen, but similar 
to the new member states, Bulgarians trust only 
the European Union, its institutions and interna-
tional organisations. Also, at least every second 
Bulgarian trusts the European Commission (BG 
- 51%, EU27 - 47%) and the European Parlia-
ment (BG - 57%, EU27 - 51%), and almost half 
of those polled trust the European Central Bank 
(BG - 49%, EU27 - 48%) and the Council of the 
EU (BG - 46%, EU27 - 42%). On the contrary, 
mistrust in the Community institutions is on the 
rise in the EU27, but in Bulgaria it has dropped 
and is now half the EU average for each and ev-
ery EU institution. The Bulgarians show highest 
mistrust in the country’s political and executive 
power. In contrast to the Bulgarians, the regional 
and local authorities gain the highest level of 
trust among citizens in the EU (50%). However, 
Bulgarians reports of mistrust towards national 
governments, parliaments and the judiciary 
prove to have the highest levels and the lowest 
trust scores in the whole Eurobarometer survey.
7. Conclusion
Albeit enthusiastic about their future at 
the beginning of the twenty first century, the citi-
zens of Bulgaria and Russia display more apa-
thy. Observing the development of post-commu-
nist societies has further proven that democratic 
conditions do not always co-exist with the vig-
orous political activism and civic associations. 
Instead, as stated by Nikolay Valkov, low asso-
ciational activity rates in these countries should 
be understood as something, which has its own 
internal logic and explanation (Valkov, 2009: 14). 
These social patterns can be explained by the 
influence of cultural folklore on the social men-
tality, or through the institutional structures and 
political actors that are seen as responsible for 
the social welfare. While the social and econom-
ic levels in Bulgaria and Russia remain unstable, 
the cultural significance of the family structure 
will remain a stronger institution for the provision 
of social capital and trust than the intermediary 
and government organisations. Even with the 
progression of post-materialist values in these 
societies, the family will remain a traditional 
enforcer of moral values and cultural patterns. 
Thus, we have witnessed that both post-com-
munist societies portray an ecology-dependent 
structures that establish cultural and social pat-
terns.
The unsatisfactory financial status of in-
dividuals and the generational differences in the 
two societies also influence the levels of distrust 
and political and civic participation. While pes-
simistic about the political institutions and their 
quality of life, Bulgarians have shown high ex-
pectations towards the European Union. Particu-
lar support and optimism has been reflected by 
young people between 15 and 24 years of age. 
In general, the Eurobarometer (2008) reports 
show that Bulgarians have become less pessi-
mistic in national terms and more realistic in their 
Euro-optimism and the role of Europe in the fu-
ture of their country. According to these results, 
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the Bulgarians express some kind of institutional 
trust, however not toward any of their local ones. 
Hope seems to exist for the increase in national 
trust with the enhancement in economic pros-
perity and the effectiveness of local institutions.  
Plamena Pehlivanova: The Decline of Trust in Post-Communist Societies
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Pad povjerenja u postkomunističkim društvima: Slučaj 
Bugarske i Rusije
PLAMENA PEHLIVANOVA
Sveučilište u Chicagu, SAD
Nakon pada komunizma u Bugarskoj i Rusiji, oblici podzemnih za-
jednica su ostali u kolektivnoj svijesti, a ljudi su se još više povukli u uski krug 
obitelji i prijatelja. Obiteljske spone postale su novi izvor pojverenja što za 
moguću posljedicu ima nisku razinu povjerenja prema vani. Povjerenje pre-
ma državnim institucijama i formalnim organizacijama dramatično je opalo, 
sukladno s padom društvene i političke participacije. Na temelju opažanja u 
bugarskom društvo od 2000. godine naovamo, smatram kako osobni kontakti, 
naspram formalnih organizacija, stvaraju povjerenje te sprječavaju izvanjsku 
participaciju. Obitelj substituira ulogu institucija, budući da pruža vrijednosne 
prioritete i moralne resurse za osobno samoostvarenje. Suprotno Tocquevilleo-
vom i Putnamovom modelu, smatram kako u Bugarskoj i Rusiji osobni odnosi 
stvaraju povjerenje, dok posredničke institucije to ne čine. Nadalje, članak 
proučava razine povjerenja u usporedbi s razinama participacije, kao i gos-
podarskog razvoja i obiteljske strukture kao utjecajnim faktorima povjerenja i 
društvene/političke participacije. Studija se fokusira na razvoj postkomunističke 
Bugarske i Rusije (od 1999. naovamo) te koristi kineski i nizozemski model za 
usporedbu.
Ključne riječi: povjerenje, socijalni kapital, pouzdanje, fatalizam, društvena i 
politička participacija, posredničke institucije
